The country’s authoritarian politics, variously understood as a hybrid, semi-authoritarian, or electoral authoritarian regime are shown now to be much more competitive, to the extent that a democratic transition may be under way.
2. What do you think of the multi-pronged attack suffering by UMNO now? Basically what are the thorny issues?
On the one hand, voters demand that he reduce government corruption. But for him to do this in any serious way, would alienate many top politicians inside UMNO who demand patronage, which is after all the main motivation even for involvement in UMNO. It thus much more the fault of UMNO’s faction leaders, the so-called warlords, than it is Abdullah’s (though his family too seems to have engaged in corrupt practices) that the government fared so poorly in the last election.
3. The call for Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi to step down is overwhelming and people getting impatience for it, the question is how and when. Do you think Abdullah still able to buy time to stay?
What do you think of the transition plan without spelling out timeframe?
As the nature of grievances within Malaysia changes from discontents over corruption to economic hardship, it may be that attitudes toward Abdullah will change—and that pressure on him to resign will subside.
People will be less concerned about corruption; more concerned with sound economic management. The ruling coalition is viewed as a better economic manager than the opposition.
So, Abdullah may be able to delay or even ward off the forces that seek to oust him, particularly when those who would succeed him in the party themselves suffer so many weaknesses. It is not obvious that Najib, Razaleigh, or Muyideen would be any more effective than Abdullah in reducing rates of corruption or restoring economic growth.
4. What would be the scenario assuming Abdullah still cling to power after year-end UMNO election and retain for years? And how would his departure time benefits opposition party?
Abdullah looks increasingly likely to last in office until the year end, possibly longer. Much will change over the next six months. Public criticism will shift increasingly away from the ruling coalition to the opposition’s inability to make significant improvements in the states that they control. Further, if finally Abdullah is pushed out, it is very unclear whether this would be to the opposition’s benefit. Abdullah has been more liberal in his approach toward parliament and the media than Najib, for example, would be expected to be.
5. Former premier Dr Mahathir quit UMNO and critically attack Abdullah through blogging or giving speeches, is the former premier still staying on the high level of political relevance? Is he making any impact to UMNO?
Mahathir still has some capacity to embarrass the government, but first his denunciations, then his resignation from the party has significantly diminished his standing. Very few party members have heeded his call to leave UMNO, a good indicator that they see no political life or more specifically, opportunities for patronage outside the party.
6. Mahathir has just predicted that UMNO will be destroyed totally as long as Abdullah still in the office, if there's any worse-case scenario for that, how much it will cost UMNO?
Mahathir’s predictions are no longer taken seriously, I don’t think. His marginalization is made clear by the fact that while he now ostracized by UMNO, he would certainly not be welcome in the opposition.
So, he really has nowhere to go, except his blog, which will continue to have "entertainment" value, but little substantive impact. It must also be remembered that Mahathir himself is vulnerable, given his many transgressions while in power.
7. Has UMNO taking sufficient and effective initiatives to re-marketing or revive itself after political tsunami?
UMNO is showing signs of trying to reinvent itself as a reformist party—and has begun to take a few substantive, if disjointed, steps in this direction. It’s reconsidering media licensing, the ban on student participation in politics, the politicization of the judiciary, and possibly even preventive detention under the ISA will enhance UMNO’s standing.
So too will any serious efforts to rein in corruption. Khir Toyo appears to be shaping up as an effective opposition leader in the Selangor state assembly. Increasingly, scrutiny will shift from the government’s record of corruption to the Pakatan Rakyat’s ineffectiveness.
8. Do you agree that Abdullah and his son-in-law Khairy becoming the liability of the party now following the accusation of nepotism?
Though an intelligent and forceful character, Khairy further diminishes the standing of Abdullah and UMNO. Khairy is too deeply linked to business activities and conflicts of interest. His attacks at the last UMNO general assembly on the leaders of social protests and movements also contributed to his image of intolerance—which is exactly the image that UMNO must change if it is to reenergize support among non-Malay communities.
9. Do you think Sabah and Sarawak has been mistreated by the BN government while they ensure the final victory of BN?
Sarawak has not been mistreated so much by the federal government as it has by its own state leadership. In serving essentially as the government’s proxy in Sarawak, Taib has been given free reign. The scale of his family’s corruption has been extraordinary, with adverse impact on indigenous communities—which seem unable to mount meaningful political resistance—and the environment.
In Sarawak, indigenous communities have been better able to organize, but remain divided by religion and weakened by the influx of migrants. It is true that BN leaders in the two states have delivered crucial support to the government at the federal level, especially in this last election, when BN won less than half the popular vote on the peninsula.
But I am not one of those who believe that the states in which gas and mineral reserves happen to be located necessarily deserve a vastly disproportionate share of this wealth. Rather, I think it should be shared out more equitably across all states and citizens in pursuit of development aims. The challenge lies in preventing this wealth from reinforcing the government’s authoritarian politics and corrupt practices—as happens routinely in oil producing countries.
10. What are the impact of the political uncertainty towards Malaysia economically and socially?
Malaysia’s economy, like the economies of most countries just now, is under threat, especially from weakening investment and rising inflation. This has little to do with the political uncertainties that have grown out of the last election.
Indeed, the government has responded bravely by removing at one fell swoop the petroleum subsidy. This too may gradually be understood as a liberalizing reform, especially as the government devises rebate systems with which to compensate persons who are hit hardest or make efforts to consume least (e.g. owners of small vehicles). Meanwhile, the PR’s pledge to reintroduce subsidies will be seen as populist posturing.
11. Any comments on the flip-flop way of the Federal government handling issue of fuel hike and inflation?
Again, see above. The flip-flopping has been resolved. The government has taken a strong position. It is a measure of its persistent strength, I think, that while demonstrations have taken place, there has been no rioting on the scale seen in other countries through which national leaders and even governments have sometimes been brought down.
12. "Crossover" issue has been haunted Barisan Nasional, particularly Anwar claiming that he'll be forming new government by 16 September, do you think this is a strategic bluff by Anwar?
It is hard to know whether Anwar really has the numbers with which to replace the government. But increasingly, he is viewed as preoccupied with bringing about this outcome, to the detriment of effective policy making in the states that the PR already controls.
As many analysts have noted, the PR would probably do better at this stage to consolidate its position than to win the doubtful loyalties of defectors and party-hoppers in search of personal rewards. But these alliances of convenience do sometimes form in Malaysia. We recall the Wawasan team led in the early 1990s by Anwar that included the likes of Mat Taib and Rahim Thamby Chik.
13. Observer claiming that Anwar manipulating crossover issue just for short term strategy to divert the attention on the PR newly-founded yet weak state government, would you agree with that?
I don’t fully understand this question, but it seems to imply that Anwar is bluffing. I don’t believe that he is. As mentioned above, he may not yet have the numbers to bring about government turnover. But he is trying through negotiations to get them.
14. We know that UMNO-dominated BN and it has been playing racial card all the way long, what's the best formula for BN to survive after 12th General Election?
UMNO did not fare as badly among Malay voters as many people seem to think that it did. More than two-thirds of its candidates were successful in winning election. And where its candidates lost, majorities were often very close. UMNO still has much appeal in the heartland.
But while retaining its ethnic Malay support, it must find ways too of reenergizing non-Malay constituents. This might happen in two ways:
first, by toning down the chauvinist expressions of Malay dominance at the general assembly meetings, which under Abdullah have been allowed to resurface (after having long been suppressed by Mahathir) and, rather foolishly, have even been publicized through state-owned and party-affiliated media outlets.
Second, it was certainly not the intention of non-Malay voters in Perak, for example, to cast protest votes in such numbers that a PAS-led MB was brought to power. In three states, now, non-Malays will be able to see how concertedly PAS pursues its Islamist agendas. Many of these voters may well calculate that in the next election, whatever its corruption, they had better ‘swing’ back to BN.
15. What are your thoughts on Pakatan Rakyat? How would you sum it up so far?
The PR was at first stunned by its own success. It lacks the personnel, the resources, the experience, and the developed policy positions with which effectively to use the power that it so unexpectedly attained (only Anwar was predicting such an outcome—as he did at a press conference here in Hong Kong).
My sense is that the opposition is doing best in Penang, where Guan Eng may shape up as an able administrator. He is also incorruptible, which goes down well with Penangites. But his attempting to dismantle some elements of the NEP, while popular among non-Malay communities in Penang, illustrates some of the challenges that the PR will face as it tries also to reach out to the Malays. Its effectiveness will be constrained too by the fact that it can expect little cooperation from the federal government and its administrative apparatus.
In Kelantan, Kedah, and increasingly Perak, PAS’s pursuit of Islamist aims will, of course, strain its relations with the DAP. The PKR is evidently ‘exhausted’ in trying to mediate between its partners.
Finally, the PKR-led government in Selangor is mired in a different set of problems (Khalid was himself, of course, a player in the ancien regime, and so carries some baggage), and, as mentioned above, will be harassed at every turn by a potent opposition.
16. Democratic Action Party, Parti Islam SeMalaysia and Parti Keadilan Rakyat has been labeled as "pact of convenience" or "shotgun marriage", do you see anything interesting inside their synergy?
More “progressive” or “professional” elements within PAS will be able to work with the PKR and the DAP. But after PAS has put on a moderate face and made electoral gains, ulama elements tend to reassert themselves, then restore the party to its Islamicizing agendas.
The very success of the PR, then, tests the “synergies” between its partners that had begun to develop while in oppostion.
17. Do you see now Malaysia is having a genuine two-party (or two-coalition) system, a salutary effect of political tsunami?
There has certainly been a dramatic increase in the competitiveness of Malaysian politics. And while many UMNO members were reportedly “enraged” by the setback that the UMNO-led coalition suffered, it will perhaps become clearer to them that their own corruption and rising communalism, unchecked by Abdullah, were responsible for this outcome. Equally encouraging is that UMNO appears to have accepted its setback, rather than trying to undermine the results—as once was so customary for it to do in Sabah, for example.
The party is also holding together, its members refusing to heed Mahathir’s call to resign in order forcefully to change the leadership. It has begun to canvass a wide range of reforms, while engaging in healthy self-criticism. And it is serving as an effective opposition in the critical state of Selangor.
On the other side, if PAS’s Islamist elements can be kept in check, the PR will be able to speak with a multitude of voices that are relevant to the very different states that it controls, while at the same retaining enough common ground (i.e. commitments to clean politics and redistributive justice) that it will persist as a coalition.
There is, then, the possibility of a competitive two-party system emerging in Malaysia. But it is not there yet, and efforts to bring the PR to power soon, if too forcefully undertaken, may keep such a system from ever forming.
Another danger is that, while much is made in this last election of the apparent willingness of many persons to vote across ethnic lines, this is easily exaggerated. Ethnic affiliations and tensions will long remain a feature of Malaysia’s political life—though it is gratifying to see that some “maturing” has taken place.
-end-
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